This paper surveys the literature on resilience, provides several definitions of resilience, and proposes a new comprehensive definition for a resilient engineered system, which is: a system that is able to successfully complete its planned mission(s) in the face of disruption(s) (environmental or adversarial), and has capabilities allowing it to successfully complete future missions with evolving threats. This definition captures the subtle differences between resilience and a resilient engineered system. We further examine the terminology associated with resilience to understand the various resilient time-frames and use the terminology to propose a resilience cycle, which differentiates mission resilience (short term) and platform resilience (long term). We then provide insight into various resilience evaluation methodologies and discuss how understanding the full scope of resilience enable designers to better incorporate resilience into system design, decision makers to consider resilient trade-offs in their assessment, and operators to better manage their systems. A resilient engineered system can lead to improved performance, reduced life-cycle costs, increased value, and extended service life for engineered systems.
Introduction
In this paper we review existing resilience literature with a focus on engineered systems. We focus on engineered systems (systems designed, developed, and implemented by using a systematic engineering process) because engineered and natural systems work and respond differently. Our focus is on deployable engineered systems.
Resilience is not a new subject; it has been examined in a variety of fields for decades. Ecology and psychology have historically studied and made use of the term resilience most often. Resilience has recently become a research topic in man-made systems, primarily in the areas of networks and infrastructure. Engineered systems, which are systems created by and for people and are designed to satisfy key stakeholder's value propositions, are the most recent field to incorporate resilience concepts (Engineered Systems glossary 2018). Specifically, when designing large complex engineered system platforms, such as Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems, the designers and decision makers are more interested in incorporating resilience into these systems. To perform better in today's increasingly connected world, this research topic is being extended to collections of individual systems called systems of systems (SoS).
Engineered systems benefit from clear definitions and methods of measurement. Currently, resilience is not defined for engineered systems in a way that incorporates the entire scope of resilience. Literature reviews substantiate that there has been no complete or agreed upon method for evaluating engineering resilience (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016; Sheard & Mostashari, 2008; Reid & Botterill, 2013) . Most discussions of resilience focus on design principles and methods for improving resilience. This paper compiles the definitions from the existing literature and develops a definition for engineered systems resilience that does not include the means to attain resilience as part of the definition. The means to achieve resilience span a wide array of time frames from predesign until after the system has been deployed and completed many missions. Accordingly, we incorporated all the time frames over which resilience should be considered into our definition. To better understand the effect that time plays on engineered systems resilience, we partition these timeframes using the proposed Resilience Cycle into two segments: mission resilience and platform resilience.
This definition and the associated framework allow for a better discussion of resilience, which can aid in the design, development, operation, and evaluation of a complex system. By considering the entire resilience cycle we can improve analysis and evaluation of resilience in these engineered systems. This improved analysis allows for better product life cycle management, which is crucial for improving the performance of new product development (NPD) (Tai, 2017) .
We start this paper by providing an explanation of the literature review process and a summary of the current state of the engineered system resilience literature in order to identify common trends. Next, we examine the various terminology related to resilience in order to understand their connection to resilience. We then review the existing definitions, explain the short-comings of these existing definitions, and propose a new definition for a resilient engineered system. Finally, we introduce the Resilience Cycle as a framework to better differentiate the multiple aspects of resilience and discuss the implications of resilience to the systems design and management process.
Engineering Resilience Literature Review

Resilience Literature Review Process
A structured literature search was performed to identify and evaluate the proposed qualitative and quantitative definitions of engineered systems resilience. The literature search included peer-reviewed journal papers, conference papers, technical reports, and International Organization of Standardization (ISO) standards. We focused on the linkage between qualitative and quantitative definitions of engineering resilience and the context of each definition. We also considered modeling approaches and evaluation metrics used to assess engineered resilience.
We conducted this literature survey in three parts. In the first part, the existing survey papers on resilience were reviewed to determine if a need existed to further explore engineered resilience or if it had been sufficiently explored. Eight survey papers were reviewed. While some specifically discussed engineering resilience, none of them focused on the engineering domain. These papers served as a starting point for the second part of the literature search, in which the citations from the survey papers were explored to find the most relevant papers for engineering resilience. This effort considered engineering journals, ISO standards, the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and the International Council on Systems Engineering's (INCOSE) Systems Engineering journal. We also examined recent engineering conference proceedings. The International Organization of Standardization does not include resilience in the systems engineering standard. The only standard reference to resilience is in ISO/TC 292 -Security and Resilience, which was not pertinent to engineered systems as it focuses on community and organizational resilience (International Organization for Standards, 2016). The final source that we reviewed in this portion of the literature review was the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK). In addition to the eight survey papers on resilience, this portion of the literature review found 38 papers that provided some definition of engineering resilience.
For the third part of the literature review we used a systematic literature review. Cronin et al. (2008) provide detail information on the systematic literature review process. Our searches included the Web of Science, ProQuest, and Google Scholar databases. A search was performed on the terms:
• Resilience
• Resilience 'and' Engineering
•
Engineered Resilient Systems
For each of these search terms in each database we reviewed the 100 most relevant papers. The following criteria were used to determine which of these papers were relevant. The paper must:
• be a journal or conference proceeding
• discuss engineered resilience
• provide a definition of resilience
The first criterion ensures only peer-reviewed references are used. The second criterion excluded many papers that used resilience in reference to psychology, ecology, and socio-ecological systems. The final criterion ensured that a paper did not simply state that resilience was added, but actually defined resilience. Any papers that used another author's definition were excluded in favor of the original source of the definition. The first two criteria were able to be assessed by using the meta-data for the title and the abstract. This eliminated 856 paper, leaving 44 papers. For (Reid & Botterill, 2013) ; however, only four papers considered engineering resilience. Ryan, Jacques, and Colombi (2013) noted the confusion of resilience terms that included flexibility, adaptability, and robustness. Later in 2015, Larkin et al. (2015) described how various United States governmental organizations defined and measured resilience and identified four resilience functions: plan, absorb, recover, and adapt. This resilience framework considered four different time frames: before a threat, during a threat, in the short term after a threat, and in the long term after a threat. Uday and Marais (2015) looked at resilience in more complex systems of systems (SoS). They noted that at a basic or component level, reliability and resilience are very similar, but begin to differ drastically with increasing complexity towards a SoS. They noted that they "were unable to find any published papers that provide a focused review of designing and operating resilient SoS" (p. 492). They outlined ten design principles that can be used to increase resilience but acknowledged there are currently no methods that satisfactorily evaluate resilience. A recent resilience literature survey reviewed the definitions and measures of system resilience and looked at 144 different sources, 12 of which were in the engineering domain (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016) .
Based on our initial analysis of the literature, we determined that there is a need to focus on a narrower definition of resilience that is specific to the engineering domain in order better define the term "engineered resilience." In addition to understanding the current literature on the definitions and measures of engineered resilience, this paper will clarify and organize several related terms in the literature
Attributes of Engineering Resilience Literature
In Table 1 , the 44 papers with resilience definitions are classified using 9 categories (author, publication year, number of citations, definition, time, model, system type, methods of improvement, and application) to provide insights into the different attributes of each paper. The publication year and the number of times the work has been cited according to Google Scholar (Google, 2018) provides insight into the timeframe of the article and its impact on other scholarly work. Figure 5 summarizes the relative frequency of the information found in Table 1 .
The definition category had three subcategories: qualitative, conceptual framework, and quantitative. Qualitative definitions describe resilience. A conceptual framework provides a more complete understanding of resilience. It describes how resilience factors into the systems operation throughout its life cycle and how it interacts with other characteristics of the system. Quantitative definitions are methods that mathematically evaluate resilience. The quantitative definitions included area-under-the-curve analysis, network performance, and several other calculations that viewed resilience to be an extension of an existing concept (e.g., safety or reliability). While at least one of these methods of defining resilience was a requirement to be included in our literature survey, 19 papers provided definitions that fit into two or more of these categories. Most papers contained either a qualitative or conceptual framework definition rather than a quantitative definition. Categorizing each paper revealed that most of the research on engineering resilient systems has focused on qualitative definitions (39 papers contained qualitative definitions or conceptual frameworks while only 19 contained quantitative definitions). Without understanding exactly what resilience is and how to measure it, there is no way for managers to assess its value in the design space.
The time category classifies each paper based on the resilient time frames. These time frames are before the disruption, during the disruption, short-term-after the disruption, and long-term-after the disruption. Before the disruption involves planning for and designing for disruptions the system might encounter. During the disruption involves any action while the disruption is occurring such as surviving, absorbing, resisting, avoiding, and repelling the threat. Short-term-after involves restoring the system after a disruption, including recovery, flexibility and adaptability. Long-term-after the disruption, includes flexibility, adaptability, engineering change, and modifying the system to better handle any new disruptions that arise. Most of the papers considered resilience during and in the short-term-after timeframes. This time categorization is a building block of our Resilience Cycle, discussed later in the paper.
Since a quantitative model is an end goal of defining engineering resilience, the 44 papers were classified by the type of model used. The model categories included single objective, multiple objective, cost, or value models. The most complete model used a multiple objective model that included cost and value (Sitterle, Curry, Freeman, & Ender, 2014) . The quantitative definitions typically focused on a single objective and related cost models. This review demonstrated an opportunity to create a more complete quantitative evaluation method that includes multiple objectives, value and cost models, which can be tailored to an organization's preferences and goals.
The next category in the table is the system level presented in the paper, with options being component, subsystem, or system of systems (SoS). Every paper reviewed discussed the resilience of a system; however, many of these also considered how other levels of a system impacted, or were impacted by, the system's resilience. This category proved enlightening because the way resilience applies varies at each level of the system. Understanding these variations is useful during new product development. The resilience of a single car's engine is different than the resilience of the Humvee vehicle platform and those are both different than an onboard navigation system that is used across multiple vehicles and platforms. In general, the lower the level of the system, the easier it was to evaluate resilience. The resilience of individual components was stated to be the same as reliability (Shafieezadeh & Burden, 2014) . Ayyub (2014) continued to evaluate resilience as an extension of reliability through to the system level. In his calculations, he showed each additional component reduces the resilience of the system as it increases the likelihood that any one component could fail. This does not consider the complete view of resilience which could incorporate redundancy and the specific impact of the component failure. Taking a limited view of resilience in the system design phase could cause significant delays during new product development or even worse yet, be released and provide poor functionality and reliability to the customer. The primary discussion of components and subsystems was how they impact the resilience of the system, through practices such as redundancy, flexibility, and modularity (Madni, 2012; Jin, Li, & Kang, 2017; Mitchell, 2007; Dinh, Pasman, Gao, & Mannan, 2012) . Some authors believed that components viewed in isolation gave no information about resilience, and that one must evaluate the entire systems performance in order to make any useful claim about resilience (Park, Seager, Rao, Convertino, & Linkov, 2013; Alderson, Brown, & Carlyle, 2015) .
System of Systems was the final level in the category. The majority of papers that discussed SoS were infrastructure related. A SoS must have two primary characteristics that distinguish it from a system and subsystems -managerial and operational independence (Maier, 1996) . This means that not only can the system operate without the other systems, but that it is typically operated independent of the greater coordinated SoS. Many of the examples and demonstrations also focused on natural disasters, as seen in the application column of Table 1 . SoS was not always the terminology used by the author to refer to this concept. Ettouney (2014) referred to systems as assets and a community was a collection of interdependent related assets, which aligns with the definition of a SoS. These SoS cases were the most difficult to evaluate resilience in, with only one paper that discussed SoS providing a quantitative definition of resilience (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2013) .
The last two categories were methods of resilience improvement and application area. A paper was categorized as containing a method of improvement if it provided a means or suggestion on how to improve resilience, such as adding redundancy. Twenty-one of the papers discussed ways to improve resilience. While we have referred to these ways to improve resilience thus far as means, many of the authors refer to these as design principles. Once we fully define resilience and begin to quantitatively assess it, these means and principles can provide the basis for developing more resilient systems. These more resilient systems can contribute to better overall product designs. The application category was used to identify the application domain. The most frequent applications were for generic engineered systems and infrastructure.
While these are the common attributes we identified and discuss, it is important to note that the literature discusses other important resilience constructs. This includes operational resilience, proactive, and reactive resilience.
Literature Trends
Qualitative definitions of resilience were the most common as it is difficult to discuss a concept without providing at least a basic description of that concept. Many of these definitions were variations on the traditional (material-science) definition of resilience referencing how much energy could be absorbed and elastically released upon unloading to create no permanent deformation (Callister, 2017) . This definition is only concerned with the during and short-term-after time periods, which are the most commonly discussed time frames, both appearing in over eighty percent of the papers. Only three papers discussed neither the during or short-term-after time frames. The remaining two time frame categories took a wider view of resilience noting that actions could be taken before a disruption ever occurs to impact resilience, and well after the disruption has been resolved but before the next disruption arrives. Generally, both of these timeframes can be thought of as planning. Nineteen papers recognized this need to include planning when considering resilience.
Just under half of the models had no consideration of cost. Only one paper used a cost model without a corresponding single or multiple objective value/performance model. Value was only modeled four times and three of those were in conjunction with a cost model. This cost and value pairing is a useful method to make design trade-offs and decisions for large complex systems. in both short-term-after and long-term-after time frames. Leveson et al. (2006) used prevent, adapt, and recover, an example of before, during, and short-term-after, while Youn, Hu, and Wang (2011) described resilience by using anticipate, reorganize, and learn, which were means that occur in the before, short-term-after, and long-term-after time periods. Another definition that focused on the during and short-term-after time frames is presented in a critical infrastructure resilience definition: "Critical infrastructure resilience is a concept that describes the ability of infrastructure systems to absorb, adapt, and recover from the effects of a disruptive event" (Vugrin & Camphouse, 2011) . Respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn provided means that covers all of the time frames except during the threat (Hollnagel, 2011) . Kahan, Allen and George (2009) defined a difference between soft and hard resilience. Hard resilience aligned closely with engineering resilience and referred to the qualities, capabilities, capacities, and functions of institutions and infrastructure. They believed that the objectives (or end states) of resilience were resistance, absorption, and restoration, however, we can see that these are in fact means to achieve resilience. These four time frames were perhaps most fully incorporated by the National Academy of Science in 2013 when they defined resiliency as the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events (National Academies, 2013).
A majority of the papers focused on describing specific means to accomplish resilience, such as anticipating, preparing, adapting, withstanding and recovering rapidly (Sikula, Mancillas, Linkov, & McDonagh, 2015) . Others focused on the methods to improve resilience. Jackson detailed 14 sub-principles and how each contributed to the different resilience phases (Jackson & Ferris, 2013) . Resilience was improved by adding redundancy and increasing flexibility (Youn et al., 2011) . Dinh et al. (2012) improved resilience through controllability, flexibility, and capacity. They also discussed resilience strategies: minimize the probability to failure, minimize the consequences, and minimize the restoration and recovery time, early detection, flexibility, controllability, limitation of effects, administrative controls, and procedures. Prevention and learning were long-term-after means discussed for improving resilience, whereas protection and vigilance were the during means that contributed to resiliency (Brizon & Wybo, 2006) . All of these are options for improving resilience and should be considered when looking to improve resilience during product developments or updates. A complete definition of resilience needs to be able to accommodate all of these means and many more.
To better understand the difference between objectives and means and the importance of specifying objectives rather than means, let us consider an example of a drone. When focusing on the means, we would claim that for a drone to be resilient it must be able to absorb the impact from a collision. The system performance and objective could be equally well served by withstanding the collision, avoiding the collision, or having a redundant capability to replace the function damaged in the collision. All of these are resilient options that operate across different time frames to accomplish similar results. Claiming that the system must absorb the impact would be the specifying the means rather than identifying the objective. Using a means-based definition limits the design solutions available to handle potential disruptions to an engineered system, which could likely result in higher cost, lower performance, or both. Several definitions from the literature are shown in Table 2 with the means underlined and objectives bolded to demonstrate this means-versus-ends concept. The ideal definition must be written in such a way that it can be widely accepted in order to create a standard definition. Engineering definitions should not include the means. For example, reliability is "the probability of a system or system element performing its intended function under stated conditions without failure for a given period of time" (SEBoK Authors, 2019). The definition does not include the possible means to make a system reliable. "a basic tenet of our approach to resilience is to maintain the key functions of critical systems, both human and technical, pending restoration." Madni et al. 2009 "In our view, resilience is a multi-faceted capability of a complex system that encompasses avoiding, absorbing, adapting to, and recovering from disruptions" emr.ccsenet.org Engineering Management Research Vol. 8 No. 2; 2019 Neches 2011 "A resilient system is trusted and effective out of the box in a wide range of contexts, easily adapted to many others through reconfiguration or replacement, with graceful and detectable degradation of function." Neches et al. 2013 "the ability of a system to adapt affordably and perform effectively across a wide range of operational contexts" Linkov et al. 2013 Resilience is the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events. Alderson et al. 2015 "the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents."
Proposed Definition
At the beginning of the literature review, we presented several apparently conflicting definitions of resilience. Further examination reveals that the definitions were not conflicting, but rather contained overlapping terminology as discussed in the previous section. This conflict was caused not by the definitions themselves, but rather by the scope of the definitions. Several of the definitions focused on a specific application area or used means instead of providing a broad translatable definition. Our proposed definition refined from (Anonymous) focuses on the objectives of resilience rather than the means and can be applied to any engineered system. It also includes current and future uses.
An engineered resilient system is a system that is able to successfully complete its planned mission(s) in the face of disruption(s) (environmental or adversarial), and has capabilities allowing it to successfully complete future missions with evolving threats.
This definition spans all of the definitions surveyed in this literature search. A mission is a generic term used for whatever the system needs to accomplish. For a running watch, that mission could be tracking time on a run, while a future mission could be tracking time during a swim. While the watch that one consumer purchased may not be able to adapt to the new mission, the watch platform as a whole could be improved to handle it. This new mission also has the added threat to the system of operating under water. A military system could have been designed to repel small arms fire in the jungle but is later retasked to a dessert environment where IEDs are a new threat that the platform would need to handle.
The means to complete a mission may be to repel, resist, or absorb (or any other means discussed in the literature) the threat to prevent the deterioration of any mission critical functions. Be it activity tracking in the watch, or mobility and safety in the military vehicle.
In the face of a disruption, the system or its operators/users will respond in some way; it may be an active response such as avoiding the disruption (e.g., going around a storm) or a passive response of simply absorbing or resisting the disruption (e.g., a system that is waterproof will be unharmed by the rain). If the threat does cause a deterioration of the function, there needs to be a means of recovering those functions to the required minimum levels. Here again the design decision to include distributed capacity, redundancy, flexibility, or any other method will affect the resilient responses. After the specific disruption has ended and the mission is complete, the system should then be able to adapt and be modified to improve its response to similar threats in the future. This extends its lifecycle instead of requiring an entirely new system to handle the disruption. While keeping these concepts in mind, it is important to plan and prepare for threats and responses in advance during the system design phase because as noted by Dinh et al. (2012) how fast and effective this response is will depend not only on recovery plans, but also on the system design itself. Kahan, Allen, and George (2009) also stated that resilience needs to be planned in advance-before systems are damaged and undesired consequences occur. This "in advance" time period can occur at a variety of times throughout the system's life cycle since there are many threats that the system will likely encounter.
It is important to note that this is not a new definition for resilience. Standard dictionaries and international organizations already define resilience. For example, the SEBoK defines resilience as the "ability to maintain capability in the face of adversity (SEBoK Authors, 2019) ." Our proposed definition builds upon this idea and provides more clarity for engineered systems. The proposed definition more clearly defines what the resilient engineered system should achieve and under what system specific conditions. (Bruneau et al., 2003) . A third adjustment would be a change to the system that would allow it to reduce the disrupted time, by reducing the amount of time between when the disruptive event has finished (t d ) and when the recovery begins (t s ). A platform resilience change could also be made to increase the final value of φ(t t ), allowing it to better recover from a disruption. A platform resilience change could also be made that would increase the initial performance φ(t 0 ). This would allow the system to better complete its mission and deal with additional disruptions, thus increasing the performance at every step along the resilience curve. It is worth noting that this is a simplified figure. Any system could have numerous performance measures each with its own unique curve. Furthermore, none of the sections need be made of simple line segments. They may be curved or made of multiple segments. Lastly, the system performance does not always begin or end at optimal performance.
In relation to the multiple performance curves, the effect of stresses and disruptions on one part of the system can affect the ability of other systems to withstand stresses (Mitchell, 2007) . This emphasizes the need for high-quality modeling and simulation that captures the complete interactions between components, and systems in a SoS context.
Implications
In order to effectively incorporate resilience into a system design, engineering managers need to understand resilience and what can be done to improve resilience throughout the systems life cycle. Disruptions and system failures are inevitable for any engineering system. Copper states "A key challenge faced by new product development is how to acquire and manage sources of uncertainty in order to reduce the risk of failure of either the project or the resulting product" (Cooper, 2003) Resilience provides a way to deal with those disruptions and uncertainty in the most effective way. Robustness and resilience could be considered insurance policies against risk and uncertainty in long-term-after plans and designs, especially where technological, budget or even focus shifts are likely (Richards, 1996) . Resilient engineered systems have the ability to extend the service life of a system or a platform and significantly increase the value provided over the life of the system. Thought of another way, the impact that research and development and manufacturing costs have on the total cost of the system is reduced as the service life extends. Resilience is quickly becoming an important consideration due to the increasing complexity of engineered systems, rapidly developing technology, and an ever-increasing set of possible disruptions from the environment, technological malfunctions, human error, and malicious activity. As complexity of systems has increased, so too have cost overruns; engineering more resilient systems is a way to combat this trend (Roberts, Mazzuchi, & Sarkani, 2016) . The definition and framework provided in this paper will help retain the focus of the value of resilience. It also demonstrates the various points in a systems life cycle that resilience can be incorporated and that it is not just an upfront investment, but can continually be improved with intelligent design and careful planning.
Summary and Future Work
In this paper we reviewed the engineered systems resilience literature. We found no standard definition of resilience and the definitions found included a variety of means in their definitions of resilience while not including the objectives over the full life cycle. This paper provides a new definition of a resilient engineered systems that includes the objectives of resilience without dictating the means to achieve them -An resilient engineered system is a system that is able to successfully complete its planned mission(s) in the face of disruption(s) (environmental or adversarial), and has capabilities allowing it to successfully complete future missions with evolving threats. This definition is useful because it encompasses the totality of what resilience means and enables more meaningful conversations about how to improve the system resilience during new product/system development. We also developed the resilience cycle which separates mission resilience (short term) and platform resilience (long term). An understanding of engineered systems resilience can help engineering managers, designers, and other engineered system stakeholders evaluate resilient options to improve the affordability and value provided to the customer over the product/system life cycle.
Much of the current work on quantifying resilience is focused on mission resilience. Future work should build upon the definition presented in this paper to incorporate platform resilience as well. There is also a need for more in-depth and comprehensive modeling efforts for effectively incorporating resilience in tradespace analysis, improving the evaluation of the usefulness of various system resilience options, and assessing platform resilience, as seen in the literature search results. The lack of value models, specifically using multiple performance measures, in the literature make it difficult to develop tradespace analysis methods. Additionally, the literature search demonstrates resilience research opportunities in the development of techniques, principles, and etc. during the long-term time frame of resilience. A more in-depth analysis of resilience terminology will help improve resilience research. This includes categorizing resilience terminology by proactive and reactive.
